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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND
UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

by

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Commander, United States Navy


A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

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The United Nations has sponsored peace-keeping operations in countries all over the world since 1947, but naval forces have rarely been involved, a surprising circumstance, given the utility of navies. The tenets of the *National Security Strategy* apply to UN peace-keeping operations, and US Naval involvement in these operations would promote US national goals. There is evidence that the UN may soon be involved in maritime operations, and it has begun experimenting with small seagoing forces, for there are many missions applicable to UN control. Over the years, the UN has developed doctrine for the ground forces in peace-keeping operations, but if naval forces are to be integrated into peace-keeping, there are several issues that must be resolved, including command and control, sovereignty, the Law of the Sea, and financing and logistics. These issues are resolvable, and participation of the US Navy in UN operations is recommended.

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THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the Gulf, we saw the United Nations playing the role dreamed of by its founders, with the world's leading nations orchestrating and sanctioning collective action against aggression.

President George Bush¹

Almost as significant as the defeat of Iraq in the recent Gulf war was the United Nations' role in authorizing and coordinating international military efforts. The potency of the UN mandate for the use of force enabled rapid mobilization of the world's armed forces and greatly strengthened the bonding of the alliance against Iraq. No longer just a debating society, the UN has attained considerable influence in formulating and directing global policy, and the world sees the UN as a legitimate participant in the conduct of international events. Indeed, United States national policy explicitly supports the UN, and the *National Security Strategy* states that the US seeks to "... strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress"²

Authorizing a great war, however, is an unusual event for the UN, for by far the more customary (and less sensational) operation is peace-keeping, and the maintenance of international peace and security. Since the first operation in Indonesia in 1947, the UN has supervised over fifteen major peace-keeping events on three continents.³ Here too, the UN has become much more visible and dynamic; the scope and intensity of peace-keeping have increased, and the current efforts in Cambodia and Yugoslavia involve very large, multi-national forces in complex and difficult operations with significant financing and logistics.

As its founders intended, the UN is becoming the world's primary agent for active enforcement of global peace and security.

If there is one surprising attribute of these peace-keeping operations in the forty-five years since Indonesia, though, it is the minimal contribution of maritime forces. Despite the fact that every country which the UN has entered has had a seacoast, the number of times that navies have participated in the missions can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and most of these were over twenty-five years ago. Whether because of member nations' reluctance to part with their ships, or simply an absence of need for their services, the UN has seldom called for maritime forces.

Recent events, however, show that the UN is becoming aware of the versatility and mobility of seagoing forces, and it has begun incorporating them into its operations, under its control and flying the UN flag. Indeed, with the expansion of economic exclusion zones out to 200 miles, and the increase in international drug smuggling, maritime missions are increasing in visibility and importance, and it is likely that the UN will soon develop more requirements for ships and navies, not just for peace-keeping, but peace-enforcing as well. The US Navy must now consider whether it intends to participate in these operations and how it will do so.

Should the US Navy contribute forces to UN operations? Would US ships flying the UN flag contribute to the success of a mission and promote world peace, or would they instead lose their freedom of action and possibly their sovereignty, becoming subject to, in Thomas Jefferson's words, "... an entangling alliance"? And, if the ships are used by the UN, how should command and control be accomplished? The intent of this paper is to investigate these questions, determine the benefits and liabilities of the US Navy's assignment to UN missions, and recommend a course of action for involvement.

To properly examine the possibilities of these operations, the history and control of UN peace-keeping forces on land will be examined, and then extrapolated to cover the

seagoing forces, as well. Chapter II summarizes historical contributions of naval forces to the UN, and describes possible future missions, with justification for conducting them under the UN flag. Chapter III describes how UN peace-keeping operations work in general, and summarizes all aspects of the missions, including the authorization of the UN to assemble forces, how forces are raised, controlled, and supplied, and legal matters, including the law of armed conflict as it applies to international bodies. It goes into some detail to provide a base on which to build the case for or against naval involvement. This discussion is followed by Chapter IV, which examines how the rules of Chapter III would apply to seagoing forces in United Nations missions. Conclusions and recommendations are then presented in Chapter V.

CHAPTER II

FORMER AND FUTURE MISSIONS

There has been no major difficulty.

RADM George C. Dyer, CTF-95¹

Past and Present.

Considering the US Navy's extensive history in early United Nations operations, it is curious that there has been so little involvement during the past two decades. America's first participation in UN peace-keeping was in 1948, with two destroyers which assisted in Middle East truce supervision, observing Arab-Israeli conduct at sea. Several years later, an LST was briefly part of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) off the coast of Egypt, and from 1961 through 1964, *USS Blatchford*, a transportation ship, worked with the Congo peace-keeping forces.²

During the Korean war, the US Navy was one of ten serving in Task Force 95, the "United Nations Blockading and Escort Force." The ships of this force flew the UN flag and command of its various task groups rotated among officers of all the nations; TF 95.1, in particular, which patrolled the west coast of Korea, was commanded throughout the war by a British Rear Admiral. RADM Dyer, USN, who commanded the force, was adamant that the ten navies were able to work together effectively.³

Since 1964, though, the UN has not asked for a US Navy ship to participate in a peace-keeping force, and no US Navy ship has flown the UN flag since the Korean war. The UN has not been without concerns at sea, however, and it has recently experimented with maritime forces. From November 1989, until December 1991, Argentina provided four patrol boats with crews to the UN observer group in Central America to help monitor irregular cross-border traffic in the Gulf of Fonseca, between Nicaragua, Honduras, and El

Salvador. The boats had UN observers onboard, flew the UN flag, and reported to the senior UN observer ashore.⁴

Recall too, that after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the first military action authorized by the UN was seagoing boarding and search.⁵ The UN is coming to realize the value of naval assets for forward presence and crisis response, just as the US does in the *National Military Strategy*, and if the Argentinean operation is a harbinger, the UN will want to use the ships as part of a force under its own command. As for the types of missions, there are several that are worthy of being conducted under the UN aegis.

Future Missions.

Contemporary literature is frequently addressing the role of international forces, especially naval forces, in conflict resolution, peacetime contingencies, and peace-keeping.⁶ Some of the more prevalent ideas are:

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Patrols. Since EEZ's were expanded to 200 miles from the edge of the territorial seas, the formerly international waters contained in them have assumed new value to their parent states. Ninety-five percent of the world's fish are caught in EEZ's, and the disputes over fishing rights in them and other arguments of ownership of the economic rights in these waters may call for international supervision.

Drug Interdiction. Drug smuggling on the high seas is now a global problem, not one that is just between Latin America and the US. European cities are also ports of entry for narcotics, and traffickers are using all the traditional maritime trade routes. Control of interdiction patrols may be best managed under UN coordination.

Disaster and Humanitarian Relief. The fall of the Soviet Union, international famine, and a continuing series of natural and man-made disasters have combined to make humanitarian relief a growing concern of the world. Ships are valuable for this purpose because of their transport capacity and mobility, and those with large, helo-capable decks

are especially so. Only a few nations have such ships, and if there were to be a large operation, international control might be desirable to bring the forces together rapidly.

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). The US has frequently used its naval forces for NEO's in third-world countries undergoing political upheavals, and civilians of other nations who were present were often evacuated, also. A small nation without such naval capability that needed to evacuate its people from an unfriendly area would most likely appeal to the UN for help.

Mine Clearance. Naval forces of the world have developed expertise in separate, discrete areas of mine clearance, whether it is shallow water, deep water, close to shore, or far from land. In a complex clearance operation, with mines spread over large, dissimilar areas, the capabilities of several different navies will be required, as will the means of assembling this multi-national force.

Assistance to Inshore Peace-Keeping Forces. Naval forces can also contribute to UN operations ashore in numerous ways, including:

- Offshore command and control platforms
- Logistics
- Surveillance
- Boarding and search of vessels bound for the countries of interest.

As the international community develops more common purposes, the justification for international control of some naval operations may become more apparent. If this control is to be exercised, though, the maritime forces must adapt to the framework of UN rules and procedures. The next chapter discusses operational aspects of working for the UN as background for naval involvement.

CHAPTER III

THE BASIS AND CONDUCT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

United Nations Charter, Article 24

The United Nations Charter.

When the United Nations Charter was written in 1945, the member nations desired an organization which would not only promote international peace and security, but would have the means to enforce it as well. The ability to take military action against a state was codified in Chapter VII of the Charter, which gives the UN the authority to use force, obligates member nations to provide troops, and puts the military forces under the control of a Military Staff Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Because of internal disagreements and the requirement for unanimity of action among the Security Council members, however, the UN has never used the enforcement powers of Chapter VII to raise a force and lead military actions. Except for a single formal meeting in 1947, the Military Staff Committee has ceased to function, and is now called to order for two minutes every month for the sole purpose of adjournment.¹ The Korean conflict, although sanctioned by the UN and fought by forces flying the UN flag, was commanded by the United States, which functioned as a unified commander,² similar in nature to its role in the war against Iraq.

Realizing that a UN-directed force for controlling breaches of peace would be useful, though, the members have developed a number of precedents to provide peace-keeping

forces, based on voluntary cooperation among the member nations. Article 24 gives the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," and this has been reinforced by the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," which affirms that the General Assembly may "act promptly and recommend actions, including collective measures, to restore or preserve, international peace and security."³ The peace-keeping mission has overtaken enforcement in priority.

Peace-Keeping Operations.

What are these operations, and how do they differ from the conventional use of military force? Paul Martin, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, has outlined the best definition of peace-keeping operations:

1. Peace-keeping involves the interposition of an international presence in one form or another.
2. The object of peace-keeping is, essentially, to prevent violence from breaking out or to contain or curtail it where it already has broken out. UN forces are strictly debarred from taking the initiative in the use of armed force, and, indeed may, use it only as a last resort.
3. Peace-keeping is designed to create or restore, as the case may be, an environment in which a peaceful solution to the problems at issue can at least be contemplated.⁴

To the essential elements of the control of violence and the use of force only in self-defense, a UN-sanctioned operation must also have the cooperation of the host government. Consent for entry into the country is negotiated and becomes part of the peace-keeping resolution, which states the intent of the operation and the rights and responsibilities of forces in the country, as well as duties of the host government.

Peace-keepers are not just policemen, for they must be capable of carrying out military operations, and they are bound by the conventional rules of war, including applicable Geneva conventions. They act with the authority of the Security Council and explicit permission of the host government.

Raising Forces.

Once a decision has been made to undertake an operation, the UN can then ask member states to furnish forces under Charter Article 25, which states that "the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."⁵ Forces are offered by the respective ambassadors, and the Secretary-General selects contingents in consultation with the host government and other interested parties.⁶ Historically, the five permanent members of the Security Council were exempt from participation in armed operations to avert a superpower confrontation, but this restriction is no longer applicable, and even a battalion of Russian paratroopers is now on duty with the UN force in Yugoslavia.⁷

Should US forces be considered for participation in armed peace-keeping operations, the President can provide them to the UN under the "United Nations Participation Act of 1945." This act authorizes the President to make available "armed forces, facilities, or assistance," to the UN without the approval of Congress if the President negotiates an agreement with the Security Council to supply such forces.⁸ Since the UN Charter is a treaty ratified by the Senate, the President may be unencumbered by the War Powers Resolution when he offers the forces to the UN.

Because the Military Staff Committee is inoperative, creation and organization of the peace-keeping force is arranged by the Under-Secretary for Peace-Keeping affairs, assisted by the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General. The Military Advisor, who is typically a General Officer from a nation other than the permanent members of the Security Council, has no executive authority, but is just a coordinator and can only recommend action. The Military Staff Committee is purposely omitted from responsibility for peace-keeping operations to underscore the civilian character of the missions.⁹

The forces that are voluntarily supplied can be voluntarily withdrawn as well, which has been a notable weakness of these operations. Withdrawal of forces is considered a right

of participation, and the mechanism for withdrawal has been written into the agreements which raise the forces, to request that "... the national contingent ... will not be withdrawn without adequate prior notification, to the Secretary-General, so as to avoid the impairment of the ability of the force to discharge its functions."¹⁰ . States have withdrawn their forces for their own national emergencies and self-defense, which is understandable, but they have also done so because they no longer supported the mandate of the commitment.¹¹ Recently the length of an operation has caused states to consider withdrawal, as in the case of the Cyprus mission, which has lasted for 28 years.¹²


Command and Control.

There are two types of command structures used by the UN in its operations. The first is command that is delegated to a state or group of states, and in which the states control their own forces. This is the type that has been used in the major enforcement operations in Korea and the Gulf war, and permits a state to maintain control of its forces, while operating under a UN authorization. The forces are bound by the conventional laws of armed conflict and act as agents of the UN, but under their own flags.

The second, which is used for peace-keeping operations and is shown in Figure 1, is command entrusted to an individual appointed by and responsible to the UN, but lacking disciplinary authority.¹³ With the consent of the Security Council, the Secretary-General appoints the commander, who then reports to the Secretary-General through the Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Affairs. The commander may be a military officer, as in the current Yugoslavian operation, or civilian, as is presently the situation in Cambodia, but if he is military, he will generally have a political advisor, or "Special Representative," to assist. The political advisor is not, as was the case in the Soviet Navy, a "watchdog" over the commander, but serves instead as a liaison with the host government to handle any delicate political matters.

FIGURE 1

CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS



When multi-national forces are present, the host country is divided into geographic areas, and each national force is given charge of one. The national contingents maintain a representative with the headquarters staff, and they are subject to the operational authority of the commander. As was noted above, however, the commander has no disciplinary authority over the forces under his command; this authority is retained by the national governments.

The UN finances the on-scene forces, and allots the anticipated costs from its peace-keeping budget to which all members contribute. The participating nations are expected to cover the costs of normal pay and routine administration of their forces, but the UN reimburses governments for extraordinary costs associated with their units' deployments.

Furthermore, the UN is responsible for logistic support associated with the mission, although in cases where large logistic supplies are required, the participating states are requested to furnish them.¹⁴ The growing UN budget for peace-keeping is indicative of its rising commitment to these operations, and in 1992, the peace-keeping bill is expected to quadruple to over \$3 billion.¹⁵

Communications from the field to UN headquarters in New York are now primarily conducted via commercial satellite links, such as INMARSAT. A civilian version of the STU-III secure telephone is used for encrypted traffic, and is backed up by commercial telephone lines and cablegrams.

Status of Forces Agreements

As agents of the United Nations, peacekeeping forces enjoy many privileges of the diplomatic corps, including immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the host government. Before the operation commences, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is negotiated with the host country to secure these immunities and to guarantee freedom of movement within the country. The typical SOFA requires the forces to respect the laws of the host country, including customs and foreign exchange, but to be subject only to the civil and criminal laws of their own government.

Under the SOFA agreement, a commission established by the Secretary-General arbitrates claims among the various parties.¹⁶ Although claims may be submitted by a state to the UN for expenses, claims may also be submitted by the UN against a state for damages. These damages could include costs of the early withdrawal of the forces of a state, and property damage committed by its soldiers.¹⁷

Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict.

UN forces have but one Rule of Engagement: to use force only in self-defense. To quote from the wording of a typical peace-keeping resolution:

The force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It will not use force except in self-defense. Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council.¹⁸

UN forces are, of course, subject to the Geneva Convention and the accepted laws of armed conflict, but in the matter of prisoners of war there is an exception. Since the UN has no courts, it cannot take disciplinary action against prisoners. For this reason, the participating forces become responsible for the disciplining of prisoners and handle them under their national laws.¹⁹

CHAPTER IV

NAVAL FORCES IN UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

In order to accomplish an effective rule of law, at least a portion of national sovereignty has to be transferred to the United Nations ... and it is in this fact that we find the great public resistance to an effective peace program.

Tom Slick¹

From Shore to Sea.

Chapter II described several missions for naval peace-keeping forces and suggested that the effectiveness of the forces could be enhanced by steaming under the UN flag. To integrate ships into UN operations, however, is not enough to have beneficial missions, for command and control must conform to established rules and there can be no detriment to the country that provides the ships. Examining the topics in Chapter III which guide ground-based forces yields these issues that must be resolved for naval participation:

- **Operational Control:** Command and control must be sufficient to direct the operation of the ships, and compatible with UN guidelines, which are accepted only because of many years of negotiation and custom.

- **Sovereignty:** The historic principle that ships are sovereign territory has made nations reluctant to transfer them to international control. Sovereignty of the ships must be maintained.

- **The Law of the Sea:** The large body of international maritime law is concerned with ships operated by a state and does not address those operated by an international organization. The Law of the Sea must be interpreted for its application to UN flagged vessels.

- **Financing and Logistics:** The costs of naval operations are prohibitive, which is why only the wealthiest countries can afford ocean-going fleets; for the UN to fund a naval

force as it does a ground force will overwhelm its peace-keeping budget. The financial burden on the UN should be minimized as navies integrate into its peace-keeping forces.

Operational Control.

The type of operational control (OPCON) used in peace-keeping operations, that of command entrusted to an individual appointed by and responsible to the UN, but lacking disciplinary authority, is readily adaptable to forces at sea and would not interfere with the sovereignty of the ship. The authority of the force commander extends only to the commanding officer of the ship, who retains full disciplinary authority over his crew. Conceivably, the force commander could request replacement for the commanding officer, or even the entire ship if its performance were below expectations, but the commanding officer and the crew would still be responsible to their national government for the ship's character.

The commanding officer would report to two authorities: the force commander for operations, and his national government for everything else. If there is a dilemma in this, it would arise when the force commander ordered the ship to do something that is detrimental to the interests of its own flag. Presumably, the mission would be defined well enough so that this would not occur, but if it did, the commanding officer would be able to consult with his government through national communications channels. The agreement that transfers the ship to the operational command of the UN must be explicit and clearly describe the bounds of the operation.

An embarked force commander who is not of the same nationality as the ship may present a security problem, but this is not insurmountable. The UN has been very amenable to appointing a commander who is tolerable to all parties, and the countries that supply the forces have a voice on his selection. Forces are offered voluntarily to the UN for peacekeeping operations, and a government always has the option to withdraw its offer of forces if the commander is unacceptable. Furthermore, it is not strictly necessary to

have the force commander embarked at all as long as the ships are responsive to his direction.²

A ship which has the force commander embarked would be regarded as being under his continuous OPCON, but ships without the commander onboard have a flexible option not available to land forces, that of temporary OPCON. Land forces need continuous OPCON to legally remain in the host country, but a ship can patrol in international waters without additional authority. Therefore, ships can come and go from the mission as required, and need hoist the UN flag at the yardarm only when actively involved in the operation. This type of OPCON could apply to drug interdiction and EEZ patrols, in which ships can be available for assignment to the operation while engaged in routine, non-UN related transits.

Very little effort is necessary to bring ships into the UN communications system. The commercial INMARSAT system that land-based force commanders use for direct links to UN headquarters in New York City, was designed for shipboard service and is accessible worldwide. Capable of secure voice and data, via fax, the equipment is portable and could be supplied by the UN to each unit; an interface wired to the ship's satellite antennas would be helpful but not necessary for use. A commercial system would separate UN communications from national systems, to alleviate overloading of national channels and help prevent security compromises, and would also permit expeditious transmission of mission-related intelligence, which should all go through UN headquarters. National systems could, of course, be available for backup.

Sovereignty.

The sovereignty issue, as noted in the opening quote of this chapter, is perhaps the greatest impediment to assignment of US Naval forces to the UN for peace-keeping, for it is widely believed that once transferred to UN control, US Naval forces would no longer be answerable to the President or Congress,³ and that as international vessels, the ships

might also be subject to boarding and inspection. These concerns are unfounded, for as will be seen, the sovereignty of ships is protected, even in international operations.

Ships in UN operations remain immune from boarding and inspection. By international law, warships have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state. Some may argue that when the ship is under UN OPCON and flying the UN flag in addition to its own, that the UN is the "flag state," but this is a very tenuous interpretation of the law, and one which would not be accepted by any US warship commanding officer, at least. Furthermore, Article 105 of the UN Charter provides that "the organization [UN] shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes." There are numerous precedents establishing that UN-controlled buildings are inviolate and immune from search;⁴ the same standard should apply to UN-controlled ships, as well.

The right of withdrawal is an inherent feature of agreements that assemble peace-keeping forces, and it remains the ultimate expression of sovereignty. There has been no precedent for a country surrendering its forces to unlimited UN control, and it is unlikely that such a condition would ever be required for peace-keeping.

The Law of the Sea.

Consent of the host government is a requirement for land-based UN operations, but may not be so necessary for ships under UN control, and herein lies the fundamental value of maritime forces for UN peace-keeping. Ships in international waters need no consent to be there, and ships under a UN flag may legally be permitted in territorial waters without the consent of the owner, as well. Article 105, quoted above, would indicate that a UN flagged vessel may enter "the territory of each of its members" when "necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes." The state whose waters were entered would no doubt protest, but the only international body that adjudicates protests is the UN. The country could ask

the vessel to leave, but if the vessel did not, the country's only recourse would be to make it leave by force of arms, and risk the vessel exercising its right of self-defense.

Such a situation would certainly test the bounds of peace-keeping, and illustrates that ships can transition to and from non-involvement, peace-keeping and enforcement in a way that land forces cannot. International law and mobility give UN flagged ships flexibility unknown to the ground forces.

Financing and Logistics:

Naval forces are very expensive and if the UN intends to use them in maritime operations, it should expect to reimburse participating governments for part of their costs, just as it does for ground operations. As is the case in conventional peace-keeping, the funding should be for "extraordinary costs," over and above those associated with normal operating. These costs would include additional fuel consumed while in the operating areas, transportation of logistics to the deployed forces, and personnel transfers to and from the ships. Using its international offices, the UN can arrange for port calls to resupply the ships, and absorb the administrative costs of the port visit, including tugs, pilots, and pier space. Since the majority of proposed maritime peace-keeping missions do not require extended high-seas operations, underway replenishments may not be necessary.

Considering the strained UN budget, financing will no doubt be the biggest obstacle to overcome if naval forces are to participate in peace-keeping, but paradoxically, it can be the biggest inducement, too. Rather than turn ships over to the total control of the UN, countries could exchange token control (i.e., fly the UN flag) in return for token reimbursement. A low level of initial commitment will allow countries to experiment with UN control while they perform missions that they would do anyway, and the UN can determine the probable costs and benefits. Everyone gains; the UN gets its mission done, the participating countries get a UN sanction and a little money back, and each can evaluate the potential for further operations.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Peacekeeping units should be regarded not as an abnormal expense but as a routine and indispensable feature of the "new world order."

Brian Urquhart¹

As the influence of the United Nations increases and it assumes a more commanding role in world affairs, maritime peace-keeping and enforcement operations will inevitably come under its jurisdiction. The mobility and flexibility of naval forces can enhance the ability of the UN to act quickly in a world crisis, and because of the US Navy's experience in global operations, it is to the US Navy that the UN will first look for these forces. By actively participating in these operations now, the US Navy has the opportunity to write UN doctrine and guide the priorities of peace-keeping and enforcement into the next century.

Why should the US Navy subjugate its units to UN control, though, especially for missions that it has always done by itself? Humanitarian assistance and maritime patrol are traditional naval missions which the US Navy has performed quite well; UN OPCON, on the other hand, may mean losing exclusive authority over the ships, and adding perhaps several layers of administration, in an uncertain quest for world order.

There is only one reason why the US would turn over its military forces to UN control, and it is not necessarily out of concern for international order. Instead, to paraphrase the words of the Army's operations manual, *FM-100-5*, it is to assist in producing a condition in the theater of operations that will achieve the strategic goal. In several past maritime operations in which the US was involved, the strategic goals of the US were best achieved when its ships operated in an international task force or directly

under UN guidance; in the "new world order," UN OPCON may again serve our purposes.

The benefits of operating under the UN flag are certainly appreciable and opportune. Global responsibilities of the UN and its growing mandate to promote stability and control crises neatly dovetail the similar missions of the *National Security Strategy*, and can provide the means for the Navy to continue world-wide presence in combined operations with fleets beyond NATO and our Pacific allies. The centralized direction from the Security Council can engender added legitimacy to naval deployments and enhance the concept of collective security, also an underlying goal of the *National Security Strategy*.

The foremost justification for UN involvement, though, is recognition that even as the size of the navy is contracting due to budget cuts, the number of possible missions is greatly expanding. The single transcendent threat of the Soviet Union has disappeared, and in its place a multitude of lesser threats has emerged which are spread all over the world. Very soon, the US Navy will no longer be large enough to show simultaneous presence in all regions, and a globally cooperative, multi-national force will be necessary.

The advantages of involvement are thus apparent, and the methods to achieve it can be equally straightforward. To effectively integrate into UN missions, the US Navy should:

First, to build confidence, choose initial missions for which the experience level is high and thus stand a high probability of success. Humanitarian relief or evacuations are likely candidates. Offer to fly the UN flag in return for a Security Council resolution endorsing the mission, and accept token reimbursement to avoid setting a precedent for no-cost operations. The length of the mission should be limited in the resolution to preclude an open-ended commitment. A UN representative would not be required onboard, but could be present as an observer.

Second, use the lessons learned from these missions to formulate standard doctrine. Several areas mentioned in previous chapters for which UN naval doctrine will need formalization are:

- Incorporating UN political guidance into operating procedures.
- Applicability of international law to international naval forces.
- Rules of engagement.
- The chain of command from New York headquarters to the ships at sea and attendant communications procedures.
- The flow of intelligence from international sources through the UN organization.
- Allied participation in a combined task force.

Third, activate the Military Staff Committee for peace-keeping and contingency operations. Now that the five permanent Security Council members are on relatively good terms, the Military Staff Committee can assume its proper role in coordination and leadership of military forces under UN control, and more important, can provide guidance for resolution of many of the doctrinal issues listed above. The experience gained in management of peace-keeping operations can enable a transition to rudimentary levels of enforcement, which is, after all, a primary function of the UN.

There is no doubt that United States naval forces can assist in United Nations peace-keeping, and it should be clear that the association would be mutually beneficial. Simply put, the UN has the missions, and the US has the ships. The two should get together.

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